The Supreme Court of India has agreed to examine an important question of criminal law — whether the offence of cruelty, traditionally punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), can be invoked in cases arising from live-in relationships. With the repeal of the IPC and the coming into force of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), the corresponding provision now exists under Section 85 of the BNS. The issue has acquired renewed significance because the statutory language continues to refer specifically to “husband” or “relatives of husband,” thereby raising doubts about its applicability to non-marital domestic partnerships.
The matter came before a bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, which issued notice on a petition challenging the extension of Section 498A IPC to live-in relationships. The complainant had alleged cruelty by her live-in partner, seeking criminal prosecution under Section 498A. The defence contended that the statutory wording is explicit and limits the offence strictly to legally wedded husbands, and therefore criminal proceedings under that provision would be legally unsustainable.
Section 498A IPC was introduced in 1983 as a social reform measure to combat dowry harassment and cruelty against married women. The provision defines cruelty to include wilful conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause grave injury, as well as harassment connected with unlawful demands for dowry. It prescribes imprisonment up to three years and fine. The offence is cognizable and non-bailable. Under the BNS, this provision has been substantially retained as Section 85, maintaining the same essential ingredients and punishment structure. Notably, even under the new criminal code, the legislature has retained the expression “husband or relative of husband,” without explicitly expanding its scope to cover live-in partners.
The legal controversy arises because live-in relationships have increasingly gained judicial recognition in India, particularly in the context of civil protections. In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA), and laid down criteria for determining when a live-in arrangement would qualify for statutory protection. Similarly, in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, the Court elaborated upon the characteristics of such relationships and extended civil remedies to women who met those criteria. However, these decisions were rendered in the context of a civil welfare statute that expressly included such relationships within its ambit.
A significant distinction therefore exists between civil protection under the PWDVA and criminal liability under Section 498A IPC or Section 85 BNS. The PWDVA uses broader terminology, expressly covering “relationships in the nature of marriage,” whereas the cruelty provision under criminal law is textually confined to marital relationships. Since criminal statutes are generally interpreted strictly, courts are cautious in expanding their scope beyond the clear language of the legislature. This principle of strict construction forms a central aspect of the present controversy.
At the same time, the Court must consider evolving social realities. Live-in relationships, though not formally solemnized marriages, may resemble marriage in substance and duration. Women in such relationships may face the same forms of physical, emotional, and economic abuse as married women. Denying them access to criminal remedies solely on the basis of the absence of formal marriage may raise constitutional concerns under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, particularly in relation to equality before law and protection of dignity.
The question before the Supreme Court therefore involves balancing competing principles: the need for strict interpretation of penal provisions, the doctrine of purposive interpretation in social welfare legislation, and the constitutional commitment to gender justice. If the Court adopts a strict textual approach, it may hold that only a legally wedded husband can be prosecuted under Section 85 BNS. Alternatively, if it adopts a purposive and progressive approach, it may interpret the term “husband” to include a man in a relationship that is demonstrably in the nature of marriage.
The ultimate decision will have far-reaching implications. It could redefine the contours of criminal liability in domestic relationships, influence the interpretation of Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and potentially prompt legislative clarification. In a rapidly changing social landscape, the Court’s ruling will play a decisive role in determining whether criminal law protection against cruelty extends beyond the formal institution of marriage to women in live-in relationships.