The question whether the trial in a civil suit commences upon framing of issues or only upon filing of affidavits in lieu of examination-in-chief has been the subject of judicial interpretation. This issue was examined in detail in Ajit Narsinha Talekar v. Smt. Nirmala Wamanrao Kakade & Ors., wherein the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court considered the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vidyabai v. Padmalatha, MANU/SC/8401/2008 = AIR 2009 SC 1433.

In Vidyabai, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 8 that:

“The date on which the issues are framed is the date of first hearing… Filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief of the witness, in our opinion, would amount to commencement of proceeding.”

Relying heavily on the sentence stating that “the date on which the issues are framed is the date of first hearing”, it was contended that the trial commences immediately upon framing of issues. However, the Bombay High Court clarified that such an interpretation amounts to a misreading of the judgment.

It is a settled principle of law that judgments must not be read as statutes. A sentence from a judgment cannot be read in isolation; it must be understood in the context of the entire reasoning. The expression “date of first hearing” used by the Supreme Court must therefore be read in conjunction with the subsequent sentence, which explicitly states that the filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief marks the commencement of proceedings.

The Supreme Court merely indicated that framing of issues constitutes the first hearing, but it did not equate this stage with the commencement of trial. In practice, even after issues are framed, suits are frequently adjourned due to interlocutory applications, absence of parties, or the court being occupied with older matters. Thus, framing of issues does not necessarily result in the actual hearing of evidence.

The actual trial begins only when evidence is led, that is, when a party files an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief of itself or its first witness. This stage signifies the commencement of trial in the true sense.

The same view has consistently been adopted by other Single Benches of the Bombay High Court in Bhagwandas Kanhaiyyalal Bubna v. Shyamsundar Wasudeo Bubna & Ors. and Vinod s/o Khimji Lodaya & Anr. v. The Chief Executive Officer & Ors. No contrary position has been taken.

Accordingly, the legal position laid down in Ajit Narsinha Talekar, Bhagwandas Bubna, and Vinod s/o Khimji Lodaya is affirmed as correct and authoritative. In conclusion, it is held that the trial in a civil suit commences from the date of filing of affidavits in lieu of examination-in-chief of witnesses, and consequently, the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 becomes operative only after this stage.