Meaning and Nature:

It is very difficult to define the concept of ‘contempt of court’. What would offend the dignity of the court and lower the court’s prestige is a matter for the court to determine and it cannot be confined within the four walls of a definition. The Contempt of Court Act, 1971 defined contempt of court for the first time. There is no statutory definition of contempt of court. Whatever definition is provided under this act is not a definition but only classification of the term contempt of court. Contempt of court in general means, “To offend the dignity of the court and lower the prestige of the court”.

Oswald defines, contempt to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of Law into disrespect or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice parties or their witnesses during litigation.

In Halsbury laws of England, it is defined as follow “Any act done or writing published which is calculated to bring a court or judge into contempt or lower his authority or to interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the court is contempt of court”.

CLASSIFICATION:

According to Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, contempt of court means civil contempt or criminal contempt. Section 2(b) of the Act, defines “Civil Contempt” as willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court. Section 2(c) of the Act, defines “Criminal Contempt” as the publication (whether by words spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any act whatsoever which –

(i) Scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lower or tends to lower, the authority of any court, or

(ii) Prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner

Punishment for Contempt of Court:

According to Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.it. punishment may be increase depended by nature of contempt.

Limitation:

The Limitation period for actions of contempt has been discussed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1971 and the Limitation period for actions of contempt is a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed

1. A.S. Mohammed Rafi v State of Tamil Nadu Topic: Right to be defended by a lawyer 

Case Citation: (2011) 1 SCC 688 

Facts 

A resolution was passed by the Coimbatore Bar Association exhorting its members not to defend  the policemen who were the accused in a particular criminal case.The resolution was challenged  before the Madras High Court. The Madras High Court made some observations about the  Coimbatore Bar Association in its judgment. A civil appeal was filed before the Supreme Court seeking to quash the observations made against it. 

While granting the plea of the Coimbatore Bar Association in Civil Appeal No. 10304 -103 08 of  2010 that the observations made against it in the impugned judgment of the High Court of  Madras should be quashed, the Supreme Court also considered the validity and propriety of the  resolution passed by the Bar Association. 

Issues 

Whether professional standards and ethics require advocates to defend all accused persons. 

Whether the resolution passed by the Bar Association not to defend accused policemen in  criminal cases violates the right to be defended under Article 22(1) of the Constitution. 

Held 

All such resolutions of Bar Associations in India are null and void and right minded lawyers  should ignore and defy such resolutions if they want democracy and rule of law to be upheld. It  is the duty of a lawyer to defend no matter what the consequences are. Professional ethics require  that a lawyer cannot refuse a brief, provided the client is willing to pay his fee and the lawyer is  not otherwise engaged. Every person, however, wicked, depraved, vile, degenerate, perverted,  loathsome, execrable, vicious or repulsive he may be regarded by society, has a right to be  defended in a court of law and correspondingly it is the duty of the lawyer to defend him. 

The court also emphasized Article 22(1) of the Constitution which says that no person who is  arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed of the grounds of his arrest nor  shall be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. 

Reference was also made to Chapter II of the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India about  ‘Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette’. Rule 11 says that an advocate is bound to  accept any brief in the courts or tribunals or before any other authority in or before which he  proposes to practice at a fee consistent with his standing at the Bar and the nature of the case.  

Special circumstances may justify his refusal to accept a particular brief. 

Judgment 

The Supreme Court declared that all such resolutions of Bar Associations in India are null and  void and directed the registry to circulate copies of the judgment/order to all High Court Bar  Associations and State Bar Councils in India and the High Court Bar Associations in turn were  requested to circulate the judgment/order to all the District Bar Associations in their  States/Union Territories.

2. CHANDRA SHEKHAR SONI v. BAR COUNCIL OF  RAJASTAN

Case Citation: (1983) 4 SCC 255 (5 page) 

Facts: 

1. This appeal before the Supreme Court is against an order of the Disciplinary Committee  of the Bar Council of India. The Bar Council of India had upheld the order of the  Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council of Rajastan, by which the appellant had  been held guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from practice for a period of  three years under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. 

2. There were two charges against the appellant.  

i) The first charge was that he changed sides in a criminal case. The State Bar Council  gave the appellant the benefit of the doubt and held that though his conduct was  unprofessional, it was not tantamount to professional misconduct. The Bar Council of  India disagreed with the State Bar Council. The Supreme Court also concurred with  the Bar Council of India. 

Observed: It is not in accordance with professional etiquette for an advocate while  retained by one party to accept the brief of the other. It is unprofessional to represent  conflicting interests except by express consent given by all concerned after a full  disclosure of facts or at least with permission from the learned magistrate. Counsel’s  paramount duty is to the client and where he finds there is conflict of interests, he  should refrain from any conduct harmful to his client.  

ii) The second charge was that the appellant had taken money from a client in another  case for the purpose of giving bribe. The Complainant Bhaniya and his wife Galki  were assaulted and sustained head injuries. The Radiologist, after examining their X rays, referred the matter to a specialist. The appellant approached Bhaniyaon the  representation that he would get them a favourable report from the  radiologist/specialist if they engaged him as counsel and paid a certain sum of money  (300 Rs.) to the doctor. The State Bar Council found the appellant guilty of  reprehensible conduct. The Bar Council of India upheld this disbelieving all versions  of the appellants defence. The Supreme Court concurred with the finding. 

Observed: An advocate shall use his best efforts to restrain and prevent his client  from resorting to unfair practices. Advocate shall at all times conduct himself in a  manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, privileged member of the  community and gentleman.  

3. Other observations – Regarding quantum of punishment: The State Bar Council  directed that the appellant be suspended from practice for a period of three years as he had  brought, by his conduct, disrepute to the legal profession. Bar Council of India upheld the  sentence. The Supreme Court, however, felt that the sentence is rather severe considering  the appellant is merely a junior member of the bar. While strongly condemning the  appellants conduct, the Supreme Court reduced the period of suspension from three to one  year. 

Judgement : Guilty of Professional Misconduct

3. D.S.Dalal v. State Bank of India & Ors., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 557 

FACTS: 

D S Dalal, a practising advocate in Delhi, had his name removed from the rolls of advocates of  the Bar Council of Delhi and the sanad¹granted to him had been withdrawn. An Appeal was  filed under s.30, Advocates Act against the Bar Council of India.  

SBI lodged a complaint before the Delhi Bar Council alleging that the appellant along with two  others was practising under the name and style of “M/s. Singh and Company”, a firm of  advocates and solicitors. These advocates were engaged by the SBI to file a recovery suit against  M/s Delhi Flooring (Pvt.) Ltd for the recovery of a certain sum. Mr. D.S. Dalal was one of the  advocates, also a partner at the firm, who were conducting the cases for and on behalf of the  Firm. 

It is the case of the complainant that in 1975 the files relating to this recovery suit was handed  over to the firm and the firm had consequently submitted a bill for filing the recovery suit,  including professional fees and other miscellaneous charges. 1/3^rd of this was paid to the Firm  which was acknowledged by the firm under a receipt which was placed on record. However, the  Firm did not inform the bank as to whether the suit was filed and if so what was the state of the  proceedings. The bank wrote a letter to the firm asking for a copy of the plaint within a set time  failing which the bank would be compelled to withdraw the case from the firm. At that stage, one  of the partners wrote back to the bank stating that the suit had been filed on that day. Thereafter  the bank received no communication from the firm despite repeated reminders and not informed  in any manner on the progress of the case. 

The lack of response prompted the Bank to engage the service of another Advocate, Mr. Arora,  to find out what happened to the suit filed. It was informed that the suit filed was returned by the  original branch to the Registry of the High Court with objections and the entire suit paper-book  

Issues:

Advocates Act, 1961- ss. 35, 36 & 38.  

The appellant and his associated were alleged to be guilty of serious professional misconduct. It  was further claimed that they had misappropriated the money paid to them and also that the files  were not yet returned.  

The complaint was transferred from the Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of Delhi to the  Bar Council of India as the case was pending for over a year. Despite notices being sent, the  orders had to be passed ex parte. Later on the application of the appellant the ex parte order was  set aside conditionally permitting the appellant to participate in the proceedings. The evidence  was concluded, arguments heard and the order was reversed. 

BCI observed that the respondents had throughout adopted tactics of non-coopertaion purposely  with a view to protract the proceedings unnecessarily. The case against Dalal and Singh were  proved beyond reasonable doubt and their names were removed from the rolls of BCD and the  sanads granted to them were also withdrawn. 

Singh filed a review petition which was still pending, while Dalal appeared on appeal before the  Supreme Court. The Bar Council has ordered stay of the order and Singh is continuing his legal  practice. The appellant argued that the files were misplaced/lost and this fact was intimated to the  Bank vide a letter informing them about the suit file being not traceable and further that the  record of the suit was to be restricted and refilled.  

Judgement

The letter referred to by Singh was not produced before the BCI and there is no evidence on  record to show that the files were misplaced/lost but there was evidence to show that the files  were indeed returned from the Registry of the High Court. The guilt of the respondents was  proved beyond reasonable doubt. 

The Court upheld this judgement of the BCI and dismissed the appeal without costs.

4. Delhi Judicial Services Association v. State of Gujarat  Citation: (1991) 4 SCC406 

BRIEF FACTS 

The newly appointed Chief Judicial Magistrate (hereinafter “CJM”) of Nadiad found that the  local police was not cooperating with the Courts in effecting service of summons, warrants and  notices on accused persons, as a result of which the entire judicial process was being delayed.  CJM complained to the SP and DGP, which annoyed the Inspector who in turn withdrew the  constables posted in the CJM Court. When the CJM directed the police to withdraw contempt  cases on their tendering unqualified apology, the Inspector complained about the CJM to the  Registrar of the High Court. 

Later, during discussion of a case, the CJM was invited over to the police station by the Inspector  on the pretext of verification of papers. He went. On reaching there, he was forced to consume  alcohol and on his attempted refusal, he was handcuffed and tied with a rope. A panchnama was  prepared so as to implicate the CJM under the Bombay Prohibition Act under the dication of the  Police Inspector, and was signed by 2 others. Following this, the CJM was brought to the Civil  Hospital, where he was made to wait outside for 30 minutes in full public view. Furthermore, a  press photographer was called and policemen posed with the CJM who was allegedly in a  drunken state. This photo was published in the newspapers. At the hospital, the request of the  CJM to inform the District Judge of the entire issue was refused by the Police Inspector. On  examination at the hospital, the body of the CJM was found to have a number of injuries and the  Chemical Examiner concluded that there was alcohol content in the body but the quantity of  alcohol was not determined. When the lawyers arrived for getting the CJM out on bail, the Police  registered cases under Section 336 and Section 506 of the IPC as well, so as to make the offences  non bailable. The SP did not take any action on the matter, but created an alibi for himself  instead. 

A number of writ petitions and contempt petitions were filed before the SC from all across the  country, and the Court took suo motu cognizance of the matter. 

The facts were founded by a High Court judge who was appointed by the SC as Commissioner to  hold enquiry and submit report with regard to allegations in the petitions. 

ISSUES INVOLVED 

Whether incident constituted contempt of Court? 

Whether SC has inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt of inferior Courts under Art. 129,  and whether such jurisdiction is limited under the Act? 

Judgement:

Criminal Contempt is wide enough to include any act that tends to interfere with the  administration of justice or lowers the authority of the Court. The Court protects a public interest  while using contempt power. It is not to protect the Court from insults to its dignity for its own  sake, but because there exists a public interest in preserving the decency and decorum of the  Courts.

The SC took into consideration the different degrees of the participation of the various culprits in  this episode and punished them in accordance with the degree of their involvement in the matter.  State Government was asked to take action against the DGP as well who was indifferent in the  matter, since he is the head of the Police and all that jazz. 

The Court further laid down non-exhaustive guidelines which should be adhered to in case of  arrest and detention of a Judicial Officer. Guidelines to be enacted by State Governments and  High Courts: 

Arrest should be only after intimation to a District Judge or the High Court as the case may be. In case of necessity of immediate arrest, only a technical arrest or a formal arrest may be made. Arrest must be communicated to the District and Sessions Judge of the concerned district, if  available.  Such arrested judicial officer must not be taken to the Police Station without the order or  directions of the concerned District and Sessions Judge.  No statement should be recorded or no chemical examination be made of such Judicial officer,  other than in the presence of his legal adviser or another Judicial officer of equal or higher rank,  if available.  No handcuffing.  No judicial officer must visit the Police Station on his own for his official duties without  intimating the District and Sessions Judge. 

The Supreme Court also quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the CJM. Other Provisions referred to in the Judgement 

Contempt proceedings were distinguished on the following 2 grounds:  

Contemnor is not in the same position as an ordinary “accused.” Even if contemnor is found  guilty, Court may not punish him if he tenders an unqualified apology. This is no defence in an  ordinary criminal proceeding.  

The Court is both the accuser and the Judge in contempt cases. Therefore, the accused do not  qualify as “persons accused of an offence”, as under Article 20(3) and their testimony could be  recorded. Article 374(2): Though Federal Court and Privy Council decisions are entitled to great respect,  they are not binding on the Supreme court.

5. E.S. Reddi v. Chief Secretary, Government of A.P. and Anr. Citation: AIR 1987 SC 1550 ; (1987) 3 SCC 258 

Facts :

This is an application made by one T.V. Choudhary, a Member of the IAS, under suspension, for  recalling the Court’s orders dated May 5, 1986 and August, 11, 1986 passed in Special Leave  Petition No. 14045 of 1985, on the ground that they prejudicially affect the applicants. 

Background: The matter relates to defalcation of a huge amount of Rs.1.50 crores, by certain  officers of the State Government whose services were placed on deputation with the  Andhra Pradesh Mining Corporation. E.S. Reddy, member of IAS, Andhra Pradesh  cadre, who worked as the Vice-Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Corporation  was suspended under Rule 13(1) of the A.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control &  Appeal) Rules, 1963. The main grievance of the petitioner in the SLP was that the  impugned order of suspension was wholly mala fide, arbitrary and irrational and  violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as there was no justification for the  differential treatment meted out to him while the applicant T.V. Choudhary, also a  member of the IAS, who worked in various capacities viz. as Central Manager,  Functional Director, Member, Board of Directors and Vice-Chairman-cum-Managing  Director and was involved in the commission of the alleged irregularities, had merely  been transferred from the Corporation and posted as Managing Director, A.P. State  Textile Development Corporation. The SLP was dismissed on it becoming infructuous,  as the State Government on September 6, 1986, based on the directions of the SC,  passed orders for suspension of R. Parthasarthy and T.V. Choudhary under Rule 13(1)  of the Rules. 

In the C.M.P. No.25533/86, T.V. Choudhary, a member of the IAS and working as Managing  Director of the A.P. State Textile Development Corporation, had made reckless allegations and  cast aspersions on the Court. He asserts that: 

“The order of this Hon’ble Court directing the Government to suspend the other delinquent  officers is made without affording an opportunity to the Applicant and presumably without  considering the relevant provisions of law, case law and the parameters of judicial power and the  necessity to observe the principles of natural justice. 

It is submitted that the Order of this Hon’ble Court dated 11th August 1986 is illegal, insofar as it  directed the Government to suspend the applicant and others, in view of the fact that the  Government has exercised its discretion and transferred the applicant taking into consideration  the recommendation of the Anti-corruption Bureau. It is well settled that a Court of law cannot  compel a statutory authority to exercise its statutory discretion in a particular manner. The  legislative will in conferring discretion in an essentially administrative function cannot be  interfered with by Courts.” 

Issue: Responsibility of Senior Advocate in settling pleadings.  

Held:  

The court deprecated the conduct of the applicant and stated that the averments are highly  objectionable. It was expected that the applicant, who is a very senior member of the Indian  Administrative “It is a mistake to suppose that he is the mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants. He must  disregard the most specific instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the court.  The code which requires a barrister to do all this is not a code of law. It is a code of honour. If  he breaks it, he is offending against the rules of the profession and is subject to its discipline.” 

6. Gobind Ram v. State of Maharshtra AIR 1972 SC 989

FACTS:

Recovery suit was filed against the appellant (“A” hereinafter). A made certain  allegations against the plaintiff’s advocate (“C” hereinafter) in the written statement and stated  that he was responsible for the suit. C filed a criminal defamation complaint against A. A filed a  transfer application in the defamation case stating that the magistrate is on friendly relations with  C and enjoys C’s hospitality. The application was dismissed by the Addl. Sessions Judge who  also recorded that a report was to be submitted to the HC to take action for contempt of court  against A under S. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act. HC convicted A sentencing him to 4  weeks simple imprisonment and 1000 Rs. fine. A filed SLP in SC. 

Issue: Whether a mere libel or defamation of a Judge amounts to Contempt of Court? 

Judgment:

The test when deciding each case would be whether the impugned publication is a mere  defamatory attack on the Judge or whether it is calculated to interfere with due course of justice  by the Court. Only in the latter case it will be punishable as contempt. It is unfortunate that A  made allegations about social intimacy of judicial officers which may or may not be defaming  the Judges but those allegations did not amount to contempt of court. HC Conviction quashed.

7. Ex. Captain Harish Uppal Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Anr.  [ (2003) 2 SCC 45 ] 

Background : In light of the growing phenomenon of lawyers going on strike at the slightest  provocation, writ petitions were filed that raised the question as to whether lawyers have a right  to strike and/or give a call for boycotts of Court/s. Also, An interim Order was passed by the  Supreme Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 821 of 1990 which directed lawyers to exercise self  restraint in situations where they were called on to participate in strikes and boycotts. In spite of  the directions, the Bar Council of India had not incorporated them in the Bar Council of India  (Conduct & Disciplinary) Rules. The petitioners sought a declaration that such strikes and/or  calls for boycott are illegal. 

Issue : Whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for boycotts of Court/s.

Held :  

1. Strikes by Advocates are Illegal and unjustified. They may only protest in a peaceful  manner outside Court premises. The High Courts were directed to frame rules under  Section 34 of Advocates Act to regulate conduct of lawyers in Courts. 

2. There is no fundamental right, either under Article 19 or under Article 21 of the  Constitution, which permits or authorises a lawyer to abstain from appearing in Court in a  case in which he holds the vakalat for a party in that case. The protest, if any as required,  can only be by giving press statements, T.V. interviews, carrying out-of-Court premises  banners and/or placards, wearing black or white or any colour arm bands, peaceful  protest marches outside and away from Court premises ; going on dharnas or relay fasts,  etc.  

3. The lawyers holding vakalats on behalf of their clients cannot refuse to attend Courts in  pursuance to a call for strike or boycott. All lawyers must boldly refuse to abide by any  call for strike or boycott. No lawyer can be visited with any adverse consequences by the 

4. Grievances redressal committees at taluk level, district level, High Court level and  Supreme Court level should be established so that grievances of the advocates at all  levels could be resolved. If action is required to be taken on the grievances made by the  advocates, it should be immediately taken. If grievances are found not to be genuine, then  it should be made clear so that there may not be any further misunderstanding. 

5. It was directed that all the Bar Associations in the country shall implement the resolution  dated 29th September, 2002, passed by the Bar Council of India, and under Section 34 of  the Advocates Act, 1961, the High Courts would frame necessary rules so that  appropriate action can be taken against defaulting advocate/advocates. 

6. Advocates being Officers of the Court are a part and parcel of the judicial system and  cannot engage in strikes because strikes interfere with administration of justice. They  owe a duty to their client and cannot disrupt Court proceedings and put the interest of  their clients in jeopardy  

Ratio Decidendi: For just or unjust cause strike cannot be justified, as sufferer is society-public  at large.

8. Harishankar Rastogi v. Girihari Sharma and Ors., 19782 SCC  165  

Brief Facts- The petitioner appeared in person and sought permission to be represented by  another person who is not an Advocate, in place of an Advocate Amicus Curiae appointed by the  Court bringing this case into the ambit of the meaning of S.2(a) of the Advocate,Act1961  

Issues – The court looked into the aspect of right to practice in a court under S30(1)  of the Advocates Act subject to reasonable restriction. Not allowing a person to be represented  by a non-advocate for any reason will be a denial of justice in a country where illiteracy still  prevails. A person who is a party to a proceeding can get himself represented by a non-advocate  in a particular instance or case. Practicing a profession means something very different from  representing some friend or relation in one case. The court stated the Article 19 does guaranty  right to freely practice any profession but the reasonable restriction in this scenario is the  Advocates act which entitles the only class of persons eligible to practice the profession of law  shall be advocates. Depending on the facts of a case Permission may be granted by the Court  taking the justice of the situation and several other factors into consideration for nonprofessional  representation. But most important consideration for the court would still be dispensation of  justice and the overview that any person with no knowledge of law may not be good enough for  a case which deals with a lot of intricate matters.  

A private person who is not an Advocate, has no right to come to Court and claim to argue for a  party. He must get the prior permission of the Court for which the motion must come from the  party himself. Even then the court can withdraw the request if it feels that the non-advocate party  is reprehensible. 

Decision – In this case the petitioner showed no confidence in the advocate assigned to him and  thus the court considered the assignment of the case to the friend, who seemed to be familiar  with the law to proceed with the same. Thus the petition was allowed. 

9. Hikmat Ali Khan vs. Ishwar Prasad Arya & Ors.

Civil Appeal No. 4240 of 1986, decided on Jan 28, 1997 

Brief Facts: 

Ishwar Prasad Arya, advocate registered with the BC of UP practicing at Budaun where during  lunch interval on (18-5-1971), he assaulted his opponent Radhey Shyam in the courtroom of the  Munsif/Magistrate with a knife after which a shot was fired by him with no casualties. After the  investigation, he was prosecuted for offences under § 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder) & § 25  of the Arms Act and was convicted by the 1st Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge for 3 years  and 9 months respectively for the offences, which was further maintain by the High Court.  Before he could be arrested to undergo the punishment, a copy of a letter purporting to have been  sent by Shri. L.R. Singh Deputy Sec, Ministry of Home, U.P, Lucknow was received in the  Court of the 3rd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Budaun who was responsible for the  earlier order executed, on its abolition. In the letter it was stated that the Governor has been  pleased to suspend the conviction of the Respondent under Article 161 of the Constitution (Power of Governor to grant Pardon) and until further orders were to remain free. The  proceedings were stayed despite repeated enquiries and the sentence awarded suspended till,  when on receipt of a crash radiogram message from the Home Ministry, it was found that the  mentioned letter was fraudulent and thereupon a warrant for the Respondent’s arrest was  immediately issued by the court and sent to Budaun Jail. 

Shri. G.S. Sharma, 3rd Addtl. District and Sessions Judge, sent a complaint containing the above  facts to the Chairman, Bar Council of U.P for taking action against Respondent I under § 35  (Punishment for Misconduct) Advocates Act, 1961. On the basis of the said complaint,  disciplinary committee (DC) proceedings were initiated against Respondent 1, and found him  guilty of gross professional misconduct by taking the benefit of a forged and fabricated  document prepared at his behest and directed he be barred from practice as an Advocate for a  period of 2 years. He filed an appeal against the BC & DC order and the said appeal was allowed.

Judgment:

In view of the provisions of § 35(b)(reprimand), (c)(suspend) & (d)(remove from rolls)  and § 24-A(Moral Turpitude) of the Advocates Act, 1961, the conduct involving  conviction of an offence involving moral turpitude which could disqualify a person from being  enrolled as an advocate has to be considered a serious misconduct when found to have been  committed by a person who is enrolled as an Advocate and it would call for the imposition of the  punishment of removal of the name of the advocate from all the rolls of Advocates. The gravity  of misconduct committed by him is such as to show that he is unworthy of remaining in the  profession. In the instant case Respondent 1 has been convicted of the offence of attempting to  commit murder under § 307 of the IPC and requires him to be directly removed from the Rolls  of Advocates. Thus, the appellants appeal is allowed and the order passed by the DC is upheld  with the slight modification that instead of his being debarred from practicing for 3 years, His  name shall be removed from the Rolls of Advocates. No orders as to costs. 

10. Himalayan Cooperative Group Housing Society v Balwan Singh [2015 SCC OnLine SC 537] 

Background: The appellant is a co-operative society under which the respondents were enrolled  for allotment of apartments. The respondents failed to comply with demand for payment and in  view of this default a resolution was passed to expel the respondents from membership. The  Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Rule 36 of Delhi Co-operative Society Rules  confirmed this. A revision petition was preferred before the Financial Commissioner,  Government of NCT who reaffirmed the order. The respondents then appeared before the Writ  Court. The court observed that the Registrar and revisional authority have not committed any  error. However on the request of the respondents seeking additional allotment of apartments to  them, the Court issued certain direction for construction of the additional apartments and their  allotment to the respondents. The appellant authority had not authorized the learned counsel who  had appeared for them to make any concession in favour of the respondents. The preferred a  Review Petition which was dismissed and aggrieved by this an appeal was preferred before the  Supreme Court. 

Issue: Whether counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant makes concession on behalf of the  appellant and would such a concession bind the appellant? 

Held: 

1. Lawyer’s are perceived to be their client’s agents. Lawyer’s are also fiduciaries and  therefore their duties will sometimes be more demanding than those imposed on agents.  Lawyer’s assume all traditional duties that agents owe their principals and this they have  to respect their client’s autonomy to make decision at a minimum, as to the objective of  the representation and there lawyer’s should follow the client’s instruction rather than  substituting his own judgment for that of the client.

2. Rule 15 of the BCI rules mandates that the advocate shall uphold the interest of his  clients by fair and honorable means without regard to any unpleasant consequences to  himself or any other. Rule 19 prescribes that an advocate shall only act on the instructions  of his client or his authorized agent.  

Judgment:

Therefore it is the duty of the advocate to not transgress the authority conferred on him  by the client. It is better to seek appropriate instruction from the client. The advocates  represents the client before the count and conducts proceedings on his behalf and there is  the link between the Court and client. His responsibility is onerous. In the view of the above, the direction issued by the Writ Court and order passed by High  Court in review Petition was set aside. 

11. In Re A an advocate 

CITATION: 1962 AIR 1337 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 288  

The advocate on record had sent the Minister of Law of the state of Maharashtra a post card  along with a letter advertising and soliciting for work. The same was forwarded by the secretary  to the govt. of Maharashtra to the Registrar of this court (SC). When this was placed before the  CJ, he directed the registrar to informally enquire whether this letter had in fact been written by  him. He admitted to having sent it, but was unaware of committing any breach of etiquette. 

The CJ constituted a committee and on their recommendation, a tribunal of 3 members of the Bar  and notice was served to the advocate to explain his alleged conduct. In reply, he denied having  written the letter and claimed the allegations were false and mala fide. He went on to say that  even if it were proved that it was written by him, there was nothing unprofessional or  objectionable and is not solicitation if one enquires from another whether he wishes to have  services of another advocate. When the Tribunal questioned him about whether the post card was sent by him or from his office, he completely denied everything. The tribunal also made him  write and sign to compare the handwritings which matched. 

He was confronted about the admissions made to the Registrar he claimed to not remember  details or making certain statements. The Registrar, on being called, affirmed his previous  statements. After recording the evidence, the Tribunal was satisfied that it had been written by  him and that he was not aware that it amounted to breach of professional etiquette. 

Judgment:  

The advocate has condemned himself a liar and is either ignorant of the rules of the profession or  has no regard for its ethics. If he is ignorant, there is inadequacy in his training befitting a  member of this profession. If he knew such conduct was improper, he is unworthy of being a  member of this profession. Suspension for 5 years.